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Abstract There is a glaring gap in the psychiatric liter-
ature concerning the nature of psychiatric symptoms and
signs, and a corresponding lack of epistemological dis-
cussion of psycho-diagnostic interviewing. Contemporary
clinical neuroscience heavily relies on the use of fully
structured interviews that are historically rooted in logical
positivism and behaviorism. These theoretical approaches
marked decisively the so-called ‘‘operational revolution in
psychiatry’’ leading to the creation of DSM-III. This paper
attempts to examine the theoretical assumptions that
underlie the use of a fully structured psychiatric interview.
We address the ontological status of pathological experi-
ence, the notions of symptom, sign, prototype and Gestalt,
and the necessary second-person processes which are
involved in converting the patient’s experience (originally
lived in the first-person perspective) into an ‘‘objective’’
(third person), actionable format, used for classification,
treatment, and research. Our central thesis is that psychi-
atry targets the phenomena of consciousness, which, unlike
somatic symptoms and signs, cannot be grasped on the
analogy with material thing-like objects. We claim that in
order to perform faithful distinctions in this particular
domain, we need a more adequate approach, that is, an
approach that is guided by phenomenologically informed
considerations. Our theoretical discussion draws upon
clinical examples derived from structured and semi-struc-
tured interviews. We conclude that fully structured inter-
view is neither theoretically adequate nor practically valid
in obtaining psycho-diagnostic information. Failure to
address these basic issues may have contributed to the
current state of malaise in the study of psychopathology.
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Exposure to swans and geese plays an essential role in
learning to recognize ducks
Thomas Kuhn [37]
Introduction
Highly structured interviews have become the gold stan-
dard of diagnostic interviewing in psychiatry, primarily in
research but also, increasingly, in ordinary clinical work.
The literature on psychiatric interviewing usually deals
with comparisons of the relative efficacy (degrees of sen-
sitivity and specificity) and reliability of particular inter-
view approaches. Typically, these discussions fail to
address the more overarching theoretical issue, namely:
What is the epistemologically adequate manner of obtain-
ing psycho-diagnostic information? Even the textbooks and
chapters devoted to psychiatric interview tend to be mute
on the theoretical underpinnings of interviewing [2]. We
have not, in fact, found in the literature any single contri-
bution that systematically addresses ontological and
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epistemological foundations (‘‘ontological’’ refers here to
the nature of being of psychiatric symptom and sign) of the
psychiatric interview (although a recent paper by Stang-
hellini [67] comes close). In other words, there seems to be
an important lacuna in the psychiatric literature concerning
the interview-relevant basic concepts on the nature of
symptom and sign (what Berrios calls the ‘‘psychiatric
object’’ [4, 42] and the methods used to elicit and describe
them. The task of this paper is to address this lack in a way
that is theoretically coherent and reflects practical clinical
reality.
The goal of a psychiatric assessment is to describe the
patient’s complaints, appearance, and existence in an
actionable psychopathological format, namely, one that
results in diagnostic classification and other clinical deci-
sions. This process includes, to a large degree, describing
the patient’s experiences, originally lived in the first-person
perspective, in potentially third-person terms, thus pro-
viding ‘‘objective’’ data that can be shared for diagnosis,
treatment, and research. We exclude from consideration ‘‘a
free-style clinical interview’’ which grants the clinician
total liberty, thus failing to prevent limited comprehen-
siveness (due to lack of systematic exploration of psy-
chopathology) or guard against incompetence. This type of
interview has been shown to be notoriously unreliable [13].
For the sake of illustration, we will articulate, as a part
of our presentation, a contrast between two types of
interviewing:
1. a fully structured psychiatric interview, performed by a
clinician psychiatrist or psychologist or even a non-
clinician (a student, a nurse, etc.) who has been
specifically trained for this purpose. This sort of
structured interview consists of asking the patient pre-
specified questions in fixed sequence and rating the
responses as positive, negative, or threshold [16]. The
fully structured interview relies on a series of
assumptions that we wish to explore.
2. a conversational, phenomenologically oriented, semi-
structured interview, performed by an experienced and
reliability-trained psychiatrist. The ‘‘structured’’ com-
ponent in the ‘‘semi-structured interview’’ consists of a
list of items (typically, an aggregate of relevant scales)
on which the interviewer must elicit sufficient infor-
mation in order to score these items after completing
interview session. Here, however, the flow of the
interview is conversational. Questions are contextually
adapted and follow the train of the patient’s narrative,
yet with a constant opportunity to ask for more detail
or further examples (this includes the possibility of a
gentle interrupting and changing the direction of the
interview). Spontaneity, recollection, and reflection
on the part of the patient are strongly encouraged.
‘‘Yes/no’’ answers never suffice but always require
exemplifications in the patient’s own words. The
specifically phenomenological aspects will be articu-
lated in the course of the paper, but briefly put; this
approach aims at a faithful recreation of the patient’s
subjective experience.
The issue at hand touches upon many topics from the
philosophy of science, philosophy of mind (viz., con-
sciousness, its description, psychophysical relation, etc.),
cognitive neuroscience, semantics and semiotics (theory of
meaning), linguistics, anthropology, and affective science.
An exhaustive, scholarly review of all these issues is
obviously beyond our scope. We restrict ourselves to a few
indispensable and pragmatically relevant aspects of clinical
phenomenology and philosophy of mind.
The origins of structured interview
The development of the structured interview was prompted
by the need for improving reliability of psychiatric
assessments. As is well known, the WHO-sponsored
US–UK diagnostic project [9] demonstrated markedly
different diagnostic habits of British and American clini-
cians. It was clear from these studies that a science of
psychiatry was not possible without strengthening the
reliability of psychiatric assessments. The project also
demonstrated that the diagnostic differences could be
minimized by using a standardized structured interview
and shared diagnostic criteria [9].
The US–UK study served as an important impetus for the
‘‘operational revolution,’’ leading to criteria-based diagno-
ses, ‘‘operational’’ definitions of such criteria, and a strong
emphasis on interrater agreement, a development vigor-
ously spearheaded by an influential psychiatric group from
Washington University in St Louis, Missouri (the so-called
Neo-Kraepelinian movement). The New York Post—in a
very enthusiastic tone—described these first attempts as ‘‘a
new tool that rolled psychiatrist’s thermometer, microscope
and X-ray machine into one’’ (quoted in [66]). The criteria
of diagnostic categories, eventually summarized in the
DSM-III? and ICD-10, became, with the passage of time,
the catalog of officially sanctioned symptoms and signs,
while the remaining psychopathological features largely
went into oblivion [1] and are no longer mentioned in the
major textbooks. The interview schedules are constructed to
be as directly compatible with the diagnostic criteria as
possible, to the point that the criteria are often used as the
interview questions.
Robert Spitzer, an important figure behind the DSM-
III? project, justified the creation and use of the structured
psychiatric interviews in his famous paper: ‘‘Are clinicians
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still necessary?’’ [66]. Interviews, he argued, could be more
reliably performed by economically affordable, naı¨ve raters
who would stick to the pre-formed questions than by cli-
nicians who were both expensive and unreliable. It is
important to emphasize that during these transformative
years for psychiatry, improved interrater reliability was just
about the only conceptual or clinical argument offered to
justify the operational project. It needs also to be noted that
the notion of operational definition [6, 25], defined as a set
of rules whose execution links the concept with its referent
in empirical reality in a clear-cut, unambiguous way (e.g.,
‘‘ice = volume of water that changes into solid state when
temperature drops below zero Celsius’’) is inapplicable to
psychiatric concepts, as emphasized by Manfred Spitzer
[65] (see also [52]). In psychiatry, we typically do not, and
cannot, operate with concepts that are operationalizable in
the above sense. The recognition of a depressive state,
inappropriate affect, or a paranoid style, for instance,
cannot readily be associated with any easily identifiable,
observable facts. Or consider such current DSM criteria as
‘‘identity disturbance … with unstable self-image or sense
of self’’ or ‘‘bizarre delusions,’’ ‘‘depressed mood’’ or
feeling ‘‘restless… or keyed up or on edge,’’ or even ‘‘a
pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships.’’
(re: borderline personality disorder, schizophrenia, dys-
thymia, generalized anxiety disorder). All these features
require forms of judgment and complex pattern recognition
that challenge or defy Bridgman and Hempel’s conceptions
of operationalizing. In general, the psychometric concepts
used in psychiatry stem from psychometric theory in psy-
chology but without serious considerations about their
relevance and applicability to the psychiatry [3, 28].
During these transformative years for psychiatry,
behaviorism was a dominant force in psychology [64].
Consciousness, experience, and notions like ‘‘the self’’
were epistemologically ‘‘incorrect’’ terms, banned and
relegated (with the brain) into the domain of ‘‘the black
box,’’ with the focus put rather on studying input and
output correlations (stimulus–response paradigm) in a set-
ting of operant conditioning. In sum, psychiatry did not
possess adequate conceptual resources to deploy when it
was redesigning its classificatory principles and nosologi-
cal categories. And psychiatry continued to apply behav-
iorist or operationalist approaches even after these were
abandoned in psychology (on its way to becoming cogni-
tive neuroscience) and the philosophy of science, where
more complex notions of the scientific enterprise were
taking hold [52]. In psychiatry, there was virtually no
discussion of such crucial issues as the nature of con-
sciousness and its study, or the status of first-, second-, and
third-person perspectives. Even quite recent publications
do not provide any theoretical or empirical-phenomen-
ological arguments in favor of the structured interview.
Historically speaking, the most comprehensive analysis
of psychiatry’s theoretical foundations was offered in
successive editions from 1913 to 1954 by a German psy-
chiatrist and philosopher, Karl Jaspers. Despite an English
translation in 1963, the text had limited impact on psy-
chiatric practice and research in the Anglophone world.
Many of our key points in this article are anticipated in
Jaspers’ book ([31, 32]), as Jaspers himself based many of
his insights from the emerging science of the humanities
[12, 73]. His vision of psychopathology placed a decisive
emphasis on phenomenology, in the sense of a systematic
exploration of the patient’s subjective experience and point
of view. The object of psychopathology was the ‘‘con-
scious psychic event,’’ and psychopathology consequently
requires an in-depth study of experience and subjectivity.
Structured interview and phenomenology: a case
vignette
The following case vignette is selected from our series of
ongoing studies of first-admission patients who show pos-
sible signs of beginning psychotic illness [21, 54]. The
patient is a 27-year-old, unmarried man, with a high-school
education, who felt different from other people and, ever
since childhood, sensed that no one understood him. He
had no friends, isolated himself, and avoided contact with
others. He devotes his time to various kinds of art, mostly
painting, and takes an art class now and then. At 19, he
suffered from a brief episode in which he suddenly stopped
speaking, heard voices, and had very aggressive, violent
thoughts; this lead to hospitalization for a few days.
Table 1 juxtaposes the patient’s responses to themati-
cally corresponding questions in A. a, structured interview
and B, a conversational, phenomenologically oriented
semi-structured interview performed on another occasion.
A number of typical, theoretical problems are well illus-
trated by the responses yielded in these distinct inter-
viewing contexts.
The structured approach yields a diagnosis of major
depression. The positive ‘‘depressive responses’’ take on a
rather different cast, however, in the clinical-phenomen-
ological exploration; indeed they seem to change identity.
For example, the affirmative answer to the suicidal-ideation
question in the structured interview, takes another turn in
the phenomenological approach, with indication of bizarre
aggressive ideation, experienced with a certain sense of
passivity. Also revealed is a reversal of diurnal rhythm,
suspicion of influence phenomena (thought insertion), and
various self-disorders (disorder of first-person perspective,
disembodiment, diminished self-presence, diminished
sense of basic identity) [26, 49, 53]—all suggestive of a
schizophrenia-spectrum disorder.
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Two sorts of problems are apparent here. One pertains to
fairly straightforward information that was not asked about
(e.g., diurnal rhythms); the other more subtle issues that
often require a different kind of dialog (e.g., self-disorders).
Both problems are related to what artificial intelligence
researchers in cognitive science call the ‘‘frame problem,’’
the issue of how to decide what is relevant, indeed what is
even the relevant overall context within which to approach
a given problem [62]. The very nature of the structured
interview precludes the sorts of relevance judgments and
frame shifting that cognitive research shows to be neces-
sary in situations requiring complex pattern recognition,
which is obviously the case in most psychiatric interviews.
Difference in the process of eliciting information is
illustrated in the following transcripts, first from a struc-
tured and then from a conversational, phenomenological
interview with the same patient. Table 2 shows questions
and answers from a structured interview and Table 3
questions and answers from a conversational, phenome-
nologically oriented interview.
It seems the patient actually does experience thoughts
being inserted into his head. Why then did he not reveal
this in the structured interview? One reason might be that
he does not recognize his own experience in the rather
blunt, implicitly either/or formulation of the structured-
interview question. Another possibility is that the experi-
ence of insertion does not fully articulate itself for the
patient until he starts to talk, in more general terms, of his
experience of more subtle, albeit disturbing, alterations of
the stream of consciousness (with its apparent progression
through concentration difficulty to thought pressure, to
thoughts acquiring autonomy, to alien thoughts, to thought
insertion, and on to delusional explanation).
A characteristic feature of the structured interview is the
danger of over confidence in the face value of the answers,
as if a simple ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ truly confirmed or denied the
diagnostic criterion at issue. There is an implicit assump-
tion that symptoms exist as ready made, pre-defined mental
objects, waiting in the patient’s (access) consciousness for
an adequate prompting to come into a full view. To put it in
another way, the structured interview pre-defines what
counts as information. The nature of this information is
conceived on analogy of a substantial, temporally enduring
thing, almost like a table or a chair. Having glimpsed the
potential problems at the concrete clinical levels, we will
now look more systematically at the theoretical assump-
tions that seem implicit in the (overtly atheoretical) psy-
chiatric literature on interviewing.
The process of typification
Philosophical and cognitive-scientific (e.g., [56, 57])
analysis of categorization, together with empirical studies
of the diagnostic process itself [35] offers a convergent
picture of the actual, real-world process of coming up with
a psychiatric diagnosis. They show that, in most cases, the
Table 1 Example of different information elicited in the different approaches
Structured interview Conversational interview
He has always felt depressed and it gets worse from time to time.
For the last month, he felt stressed, sad, and angry
He feels depressed, angry, and anxious; and notes as well that he has changed
the last couple of years, for example, he finds it ‘‘very strange to look out
through these two eyes’’
Diminished interest and loss of joy Often, he feels ‘‘caught by sadness and racing thoughts,’’ it all began when he
was 6 years old
Insomnia, tiredness, and lack of energy Awake during the night and sleeps during the day. When awake, he paints,
reads, and plays computer
Difficulties with thinking and concentration Some problems with concentration, but none when engaged in artwork or
computer games. Yet he hears his thoughts aloud in his head
Denies delusions Experiences alien thoughts being inserted into his head as a ‘‘bad breath’’
He doubts his own existence and often looks in the mirror to check whether
he exists
Sometimes he feels that he is ‘‘the center of attention,’’
but knows that he is not
He feels that people are starring and laughing at him
Always felt that he ‘‘lives in his head,’’ his body is just a vehicle
Thoughts about death and suicide Suicidal thoughts and thoughts about ‘‘doing an experiment,’’ for example, to
strangle a dog or stab his mother with a knife, ‘‘just to see what would
happen.’’ These thoughts seem alien to him
Table 2 Transcript from a structured interview
Interviewer Patient
Have you ever experienced that certain thoughts
that were not your own were put into your
head?
Hmm, no
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information provided by the patient coupled with his
behavior, experience, and psychosocial history leads, in a
natural conversational clinical situation, to the first typifi-
cations, that is, to the interviewer’s seeing the patient as
resembling a certain prototype [59, 60].
In a diagnostic encounter, for example, the psychiatrist
quickly senses a patient as being in a certain way, for
example, as withdrawn, hostile, sympathetic, guarded,
eccentric, etc. As the interview progresses, these initial
typifications become more specific and nuanced, modified
by further interactions with the patient [60]. Initial typifi-
cations evolve and may sometimes be replaced; but there is
always some typification that functions as a formative
matrix upon which specific features and responses are
assessed. The concept of typification refers to a very basic
human cognitive feature, especially pertinent in perception,
namely that perception of an object is always appercep-
tively organized, that is, structured, in a semi-conceptual
fashion, as a salient unity or a certain Gestalt. In this sense,
one might say, seeing is always ‘‘seeing as …’’ [22, 46,
75]; it is always perspectival or aspectual. It involves
pattern recognition and pattern completion, thereby
allowing apprehension of objects and situations under
conditions of limited or incomplete information. Typifica-
tion is a largely automatic process that pervades all of our
experiences and occurs outside explicit awareness. In
typification, an interpretation is not superimposed on a
perceptual act; it imbues the perception itself. At least in
the normal sense, for example, we do not recognize a face
as friendly based on logical inference from perceptions of
individual muscular contractions on the other person’s
face; we see it directly ‘‘as friendly.’’
Obviously there are potential dangers in typifications;
first, that the psychiatrist can be blinded by his or her
expectations and therefore may fail to recognize sub-
sequent data for what they really mean. Second, the
repertoire of typifications that any psychiatrist has acquired
through past experience could always contain various
misperceptions and misconstruals. Third, typifications
could be misused as stereotypes if the clinical investigation
does not advance toward a gradually more individualized
understanding of the patient.
Typification is, however, a fundamental and indispen-
sible constituent of the diagnostic process [60] and a way to
give order and meaning to psychic states by revealing the
ideally typical connections instead of a disjointed enu-
meration of them [31, 32]. The scientific use of typifica-
tions requires that psychiatrists also doubt and reflect on
their typifications, and repeatedly test their own interpre-
tations by looking for additional components to prove their
typification or call it into question. Typifications are sci-
entific only to the extent that they are based upon and
tested by evidence, given through direct observation and
communication with the patient. The value lies in orienting
and structuring the first steps in psychiatric investigations
[60].
The process of typification, crucial in the phenomeno-
logical approach, is, however, eliminated or severely con-
strained in a fully structured interview, in which both the
relevant expressions (observable signs) and ‘‘inner’’ expe-
riences (symptoms) are selected in an a priori fashion, in
the sense of being, assumed to be pre-defined as well-
demarcated, mutually independent entities. Let us now
look more closely at some of the epistemological issues
involved.
The dichotomy of ‘‘inner and outer’’ and the notion
of Gestalt
The term ‘‘symptoms’’ refers, of course, to the patient’s
subjective complaints whereas ‘‘signs’’ refers to third-person
Table 3 Transcript from a conversational, phenomenologically oriented interview
Interviewer Patient
Does it ever become too much with all these thoughts? (referring to
previously addressed experience of difficulties in concentration and
of thought pressure)
Sometimes, I think the thoughts take somehow over, so I cannot get rid
of them. Then the thoughts run their own race
Can you say some more about that? It’s like the thoughts are out of my control
Can you get a feeling that the thoughts are somehow alien… or not
really your thoughts?
Yes, sometimes it is like they are… when the thoughts are kind of
solemn thoughts or, how to put it, then I can get the feeling that they
have been sent from another place, from elsewhere. Because, if they
are not mine, and they are solemn thoughts, then they must be
something special
Do you have any idea from where they could have been sent? From God
What are solemn thoughts? They are very different from my usual thoughts and are thoughts that
other people don’t think
And then you think that God is sending you these thoughts? Yes
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phenomena that are ‘‘externally’’ observable. This dis-
tinction is mainly unproblematic in somatic illness, where
symptoms and signs share their ontological, thing-like,
nature (see below), ideally pointing to their somatic causes.
By contrast, the vast majority of psychiatric signs are
expressive, linked to emotion, mood, interpersonal rapport,
bodily movement and (pre-eminently) language, and dis-
course—all of which involve a subjective component. We
can of course artificially separate the expression from the
expressed content when scoring a mental status examina-
tion (e.g., the sign of tearful eyes from the symptom of
sadness). Radical separation of symptoms and signs is an
epistemological impossibility, however, because as men-
tioned, the patient manifests himself through certain
meaningful wholes, which typically emerge from a certain
conjunction of the outer and the inner.
Here, the notion of Gestalt helps to express the whole-
ness of the clinical picture. A Gestalt is a salient unity or
organization of phenomenal aspects. As is well known, the
Gestalt cannot be reduced to a simple aggregate; the
‘‘whole is more than the sum of its parts.’’ This unity
emerges from the relations between component features
and is influenced by the whole (part–part-whole relations).
A Gestalt may have aspects, of course, and these may be
focused on in diagnosis or research; but one must
remember that the aspects are interdependent in a mutually
constitutive and implicative manner. The salience of, for
example, an interpersonal encounter is jointly constituted
by the patient’s experience, belief, and expression (‘‘inner
and outer’’). ‘‘What’’ he says (content) is always molded by
the ‘‘how’’ (form) of his way of thinking and experiencing.
Further, a Gestalt instantiates a certain generality of type
(e.g., this patient is typical of a category X), but this typ-
icality is always modified, because it is necessarily
embodied in a particular, concrete individual, thus
deforming the ideal clarity and universality of the type
[44]. We always perceive expression (sign) in the context
of its temporal unfolding and in conjunction with the
expressed contents (symptoms) and vice versa. This issue
has been clarified in a classic article by anthropologist
Clifford Geertz [19] who (borrowing from the philosopher
Gilbert Ryle) describes the crucial difference between
perceiving what may be the very same physical movement
as a wink versus as a mere blink, depending on context and
ascribed expression or intent.
It would be a mistake to think that the task of under-
standing the world requires only the discernment of identical
elements across different individuals, together with mea-
surements of quantity on specified dimensions. It is crucial
as well to be concerned with forms of pattern recognition
that involve qualitative similarities, whether of entire
Gestalts or of aspects thereof. This is obviously the case
whenever human expression is involved (as demonstrated by
the entirety of the humanities disciplines—for example,
history, literary, and cultural studies); but it is also the case in
the natural sciences, perhaps most obviously in biology
(discerning of structural and functional similarities is obvi-
ously crucial for evolutionary biology). Insistence on holism
and Gestalt qualities is not therefore anti-scientific: it is
possible both to compare Gestalts and to investigate their
interdependent aspects in ways that allow for scientific
generalizations. An illustrative example of the application of
Gestalt analysis to psychiatry is the seminal work of Klaus
Conrad on the beginning of schizophrenia [8].
The prevalent view or treatment of the psyche as a mere
assemblage of the inner and the outer is reliant on the
Cartesian dualisms of mind versus world and mind versus
body that are now almost universally rejected in philoso-
phy of mind and action. Contemporary philosophers of
mind certainly recognize the experiential asymmetry
between the first- and the third-person perspectives [48];
they also point, however, to the public or intersubjective
dimensions of experience, perhaps most clearly manifest in
emotion. In the case of emotions, the lived or subjective
aspects cannot be separated either from the context in
which they occur or from the associated bodily states,
tendencies, and forms of expression with which they are
associated—as both Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty have
emphasized. ‘‘I could not imagine the malice and cruelty
which I discern in my opponent’s looks separated from his
gestures, speech and body,’’ writes Merleau-Ponty. ‘‘None
of this takes place in some otherworldly realm’’, in some
shrine located beyond the body of the angry man [—] anger
inhabits him and blossoms on the surface of his pale or
purple cheeks, his blood-shot eyes … [45].
Symptom and sign
A general account of consciousness and its phenomena,
such as symptoms (experiences) and signs (expressions),
can nowhere be found in the major contemporary textbooks
of psychiatry in English (but see [70]. The prevailing but
implicit assumption (evident in the psychometrics of
research literature) seems to be that psychiatric ‘‘symptoms
and signs’’ should (ideally) be treated as being close to
third-person data: publicly accessible and involving
mutually independent (and typically atomic) entities
devoid of subtle or complex forms of meaning, and suitable
for context-independent definition and measurement. The
symptom/sign and its presumed, underlying causal sub-
strate are assumed to exhibit the same ontological and
descriptive nature: both are treated as spatio-temporally
delimited entities, thing-like in nature. In this paradigm—
adequate and fruitful in somatic medicine, where it origi-
nates—symptoms and signs have no intrinsic sense or
358 Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci (2013) 263:353–364
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meaning. Their role is to guide us toward underlying
physiological causes. But the psychiatrist, confronting the
‘‘psychiatric object’’ [4, 42], finds himself in a radically
different situation [32, 65]. She confronts not a thing or
body part but a person, another embodied consciousness
and its realm of meaning. And with very few exceptions,
we do not, in fact, know the causal referents in any diag-
nostically relevant sense. What the patient manifests is not
an isolated series of independent referring symptoms/signs
but rather certain wholes of interpenetrating experiences,
feelings, expressions, beliefs, and actions, all permeated by
biographical detail. These aspects and these wholes are not
constituted by a reference to underlying substrate
(‘‘extensionality’’) but by their meaning (‘‘intensionality’’).
The matrix of symptoms and signs: consciousness
Consciousness (mentality; subjectivity) is understood here
as phenomenal manifestation of thoughts, feelings, per-
ceptions, that is, broadly speaking, experiences. Con-
sciousness is not lived as a spatial, three-dimensional
object or as a thing, but more as a presence to itself and the
world, as an inseparable dimension of our existence or life:
Jaspers described ‘‘psyche’’ as ‘‘not […] an object with
given qualities but as ‘being in one’s own world’, the
integrating of an inner and outer world’’ ([32], p. 9,
author’s italics). We apprehend the patient’s consciousness,
his inner world (or first-person perspective), through and in
his expressions and communications ([32], p. 20).
As countless philosophers and psychologists from the
ancients to recent philosophers of analytic and phenome-
nological persuasions (e.g., [10, 63, 68, 76]) have noted,
consciousness manifests itself as a becoming [32], a tem-
poral flowing, and a ‘‘streaming’’ of intertwined experi-
ences (including thoughts). This streaming is not
amorphous but is organized into a field of consciousness
(see [61] for an accessible account) which exhibits a certain
structure, involving temporality, intentionality, embodi-
ment, and self-awareness. In other words, consciousness
does not consist of sharply separable, substantial, or thing-
like components, exerting mechanical causality on each
other. ‘‘Rather,’’ writes the phenomenologist Husserl ‘‘it is
… a … network of interdependent moments (i.e., non-
independent parts)…founded on intentional intertwining,
motivation and mutual implication, in a way that has no
analogue in the physical’’ [27], § 37. This peculiar nature
of consciousness led Jaspers to deny any strict analogy
between psychopathological description and the descrip-
tion in somatic medicine [32].
What, then, defines a given individual experience as a
specific symptom, given that it is not pre-given as an
autonomous, thing-like entity? On the phenomenological
account, the symptom is individuated (becomes this or that
symptom) along several dimensions, not only through its
sheer content but also through its structure (form) and its
meaning relations to previous, simultaneous, and suc-
ceeding experiences. Often, the symptom does not exist as
a fully articulated ‘‘mental object’’ directly accessible to
introspection or a preformed question, but rather as a pre-
reflective, implicit content or as an altered framework/
structure of consciousness. Frequently, it requires recol-
lection. And in all these instances, articulation or individ-
uation of a symptom requires a reflective, conceptualizing
process that can be difficult to achieve.
Three examples may illustrate the issue of symptom
determination as a meaningful whole inserted in a web of
relations to other contents and forms of consciousness:
1. In our vignette (Table 1), the affirmative answer to the
question on depressed mood in the structured interview
is called into question in the conversational approach
by bringing forth other experiences reported in the
same thematic context,—and which do not belong to
any conventional concept of depressed mood (e.g.,
‘‘making an experiment’’).
2. A smile, taken as such (in itself) cannot be predefined
as silly. The silliness of a smile only emerges within
the context of the flow of expressions relative to a
particular discourse. The same applies to the bizarre-
ness of a delusion [7] or to defining features of
overvalued ideation or magical thinking.
3. Finally, consider the symptom of ‘‘audible thoughts’’ at
the pre-psychotic and psychotic phases of schizophre-
nia. The phenomenon of audible thoughts is not defined
by its presumed acoustic loudness or pitch. It should be
suspected rather when there is a structural change in the
field of awareness, namely, a disintegration of the unity
of inner speech thinking into its components of
meaning (content) and expression (signifier; sign).
The patient seems to listen to, or attend to his ‘‘spoken’’
thoughts (or to thoughts expressed in writing or other
visual form) in order to grasp what he is thinking.
Normally, of course, we simply know what we think
while thinking, without any help from signs, and
without any temporal or experiential gap between the
subject and his thought [14, 40].
As noted above, these issues do not arise in the typical
structured interview. They are, however, crucial to the
conduct of a phenomenologically oriented interview.
The issue of language
Language is primarily directed toward the world. It seems
obvious that language must have evolved to serve
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goal-directed cooperation between humans rather than for
sophisticated description of mental states. Indeed there is a
massive disproportion between the vocabulary at our dis-
posal for dealing with the world or each other and that
suited for introspection (and even this latter vocabulary is
shot through by spatial, reifying terms). Mental terms are
highly polysemic (the same term may have several differ-
ent meanings), for example, the word ‘‘depression,’’ which
for people without psychiatric training often means feeling
in a poor mental condition [50]. When a patient says ‘‘I feel
depressed, sad, or down,’’ such statement may, if further
explored, be found to indicate a bewildering variety of
experiences with varying affinities to the concept of
depression: not only depressed mood but also, for instance,
irritation, anger, loss of meaning, varieties of fatigue,
ambivalence, ruminations of different kinds, hyper-reflec-
tivity, thought pressure, psychic anxiety, varieties of
depersonalization, and even voices with negative content,
and so forth. In our vignette (Table 1), the affirmative
answer to the question of lowered mood appeared to cover
a whole array of mental states. Moreover, mood is not an
isolated mental object, easily dissociated from its experi-
ential context and identified in an act of introspection (i.e.,
converted to a reportable symptom). It is, so to say, a pre-
given and pre-reflective manner of our experiencing
[18, 69], something that, to the one who lives, is almost too
immediate and encompassing to be recognized as such
[24]. It therefore requires a careful interviewing effort to
specify the salient profile of the presented distress. Taking
a confirmatory or disconfirmatory answer at face value
endangers the validity of the response.
This is one of the core issues confronting the psychiatric
interview. First, as we argued already, the symptoms are
not ready-for-use objects, ripe for the picking. Their final
linguistic designation is an outcome of a conceptualizing
process. An example might help us here: an abnormal
experience of strange bodily sensations might be verbal-
ized by the patient as, for example, a distressing ‘‘feeling,
as if there are electric vibrations in my spine.’’ Here an
anomaly in the field of awareness, an alien feeling or
sensation, immediately mobilizes reflective attempts to
conceptualize and describe (perhaps to regain a sense of
control and intersubjective belonging [5]. This process is
aided by metaphorical means, pre-eminently by metaphors
involving space and energy that are linked to basic bodily
sensory-motor modes [33, 39]. Here, the complaint
becomes localized to an anatomical structure (the spine)
that is usually phenomenologically mute. The description is
therefore strange, yet still accessible to intersubjective
understanding. The phrasing of ‘‘electric vibrations’’ gives
us at least a glimpse of ‘‘what it is like’’ to have this
symptom (which is a meaning-generative effect of the
metaphor). Perhaps, a further concretization of this metaphor,
away from its intersubjective anchoring, would make the
statement close to a delusion. But in our example, the
conditional ‘‘as if there are electric vibrations in my spine,’’
indicates that the patient has retained a grip on reality and
maintains a reflective distance to his experience. He does
not say, for example, ‘‘I know that there are electric
vibrations in my spine,’’ in which case we might well
consider him delusional.
The interviewer: his role and activity
In the structured approach, the interviewer must faithfully
asks in a pre-determined sequence, a series of closed pre-
defined questions, corresponding to the diagnostic criteria.
To maintain the purity of the quasi-experimental frame-
work, it is crucial to minimize variance in the interviewer’s
performance and, especially, to quash any potential ten-
dency to inference and interpretation or any tendency for
the patient to veer from the initial question.
By contrast the phenomenological approach is an emi-
nently second person or I-thou situation in which inter-
personal rapport is crucial. The interviewer is expected
(and trained) to acquire a friendly and concerned attitude
that is nevertheless neutral, non-invasive, and non-voy-
euristic. It is extremely important to convey to the patient
that even talking about the most bizarre experiences or
fantasies is not beyond the psychiatrist’s professional
competence and familiarity.
The latter point pertains to what is perhaps the most
distinctively phenomenological aspect of the interview
described here, an aspect that might be compared with the
famous ‘‘phenomenological reduction’’ [27]. In ordinarily
interaction with other people, we take for granted that we
are all situated in a shared realm where certain things show
up as ‘‘up there’’ or ‘‘real’’ or in various other ways such
as ‘‘remembered,’’ ‘‘imagined,’’ and so on—in short, in
accord with the ‘‘natural attitude’’ [27]. What a phenome-
nological interviewer attempts to do is to suspend the
standard presuppositions of the shared, commonsense
world, the unquestioned, commonsense background with
its assumptions about time, space, causality, and self-
identity, and about what does and does not exist as ‘‘real.’’
The point of this suspension is to make these assumptions
(ordinarily overlooked) available to reflective awareness,
and also to allow for the comprehension of lived worlds in
which other ontological dimensions or presuppositions, for
example, other forms of space, time, or causality might
prevail.
The label ‘‘conversational interview’’ implies that the
patient is encouraged to express himself freely and through
reasonably uninterrupted narratives. Empirical research on
witness interrogation has shown that a conversational
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approach, in which the witness is allowed to offer his own
narrative, will enhance recollection and yield information
that is more detailed and valid than does a series of closed
questions [17, 30, 34]. In the course of the phenomeno-
logical interview, the narrative is the primary source of
information, modified by context-fitting questions, requests
for elaborations, details, and examples. Although the
interviewer may occasionally propose an example, the
patient’s reply is only considered valid if he or she is able
to come up with an example from his own experience, or at
least rephrase the example in his or her own words. Such a
phenomenological approach serves to establish a rapport
with the patient which extends beyond diagnosis to facili-
tate a therapeutic alliance.
Proponents of the structured interview are not, of course,
unaware of the information variance ascribable to the
patients’ cooperativeness. Nonetheless, the structured
scheme seems to presuppose that the patient acts and
responds as a rational consumer and motivated informant,
involved in a mutually beneficial interaction. But patients
arriving in a standard psychiatric facility (emergency,
consultation, or a diagnostic unit) have very different
backgrounds, trajectories (e.g., referrals from GPs, social/
familial pressures, self-referrals, involuntary admission,
etc.), and motivations to engage in a diagnostic dialog.
Their abilities of self-description also vary; their experi-
ences may verge at times on the ineffable. A significant
number dissimulate in some fashion, typically by hiding
aspects of psychopathology they consider shameful or
strange. Sometimes, in fact, one only gets the targeted
information by asking about something else or by not
asking at all. As a rule, established rapport is decisive for
the patient’s cooperation, especially in hostile or with-
drawn patients. These common clinical constraints should
proscribe any undue confidence in responses obtained,
especially monosyllabic ones. All this is very well known,
and has been discussed insightfully by sociologists,
anthropologists, and other human or social scientists [38].
Under these circumstances, the psychiatric interviewer
cannot be merely a passive receptacle of phenomenological
data, but must actively participate in an interaction through
which the symptoms unfold and are identified. The inter-
viewer tries to represent the patient’s experiences and to
disclose their typicality and distinctiveness, which means
recognizing certain invariants or recurrent features. A
crucial part of this process consists in a form of imaginative
variation (in which most psychiatrists, though unknow-
ingly, engage). This imaginative variation (akin to the
‘‘eidetic variation’’ or ‘‘eidetic reduction’’ of phenomeno-
logical investigation) is a conceptual operation whereby
one attempts to imagine a phenomenon as being different
from how it currently is in order to isolate which features or
aspects might be essential—that is which features cannot
be varied or deleted without preventing the phenomenon
from being the kind of phenomenon that it is [55]. The
prototypes acquired through clinical experience do not,
then, derive simply from an averaging over time of a series
of mutually independent sensory experiences. They are
codetermined by a quest for meaningful interrelations
between the observed phenomenal features, as when one
looks for an ‘‘ideal type’’ [59].
Limitations and conclusions
Our discussion of the diagnostic interview and its theo-
retical foundations should in principle be supplemented by
an inquiry into the contemporary psychiatric diagnostic
systems. Throughout the text, we tried to touch upon the
ontological and the epistemological nature of the psychi-
atric object. However, an exhaustive address of the noso-
logical issues is beyond our scope (see [36].
One possible objection to our insistence on the necessity
of taking contextual, qualitative, and developmental aspects
of the ‘‘object’’ of the psycho-diagnostic assessment into
consideration might be that such emphasis is today obviated
by the ‘‘top-down’’ operational classifications, with weak or
absent hierarchy rules. The operational system, such as the
DSM-IV, comprises classes, usually not mutually exclu-
sive, and whose membership is based on a sufficient number
of criteria. Thus, for example, a ‘‘major depression’’ is
operationally (and nominalistically) defined, in disregard of
any consideration on a phenomenological commonality
(prototypicality) of depressive states, as a condition being
present when a patient responds ‘‘yes’’ to a certain number
of predefined questions. When the affirmative ‘‘yes
answers’’ count as indicators of the diagnostic criteria,
irrespective of the qualitative nature of the experiences (if
explored) behind the answers (see Table 1), and irrespec-
tive of collateral information (e.g., years of increasing
dysfunction, bizarre behaviors, and isolation), then, what
was once called a ‘‘differential diagnosis’’ (i.e., a progres-
sive narrowing down of diagnostic options over the course
of the interview) is no longer necessary, relevant, or even
possible (cf. the so-called ‘‘comorbidity debate’’—[41].
However, there is an increasing recognition that the last
30 years’ operationalization and simplification of psycho-
pathology has not resulted in visible gains in the validity of
psychiatric categories [1, 20, 43]. Thus, for example, the
concept of ‘‘evidence’’ in psychiatry is more complex than
usually assumed [47].
McHugh advocates a return to a traditional ‘‘bottom-up’’
diagnostic interview, comprising: ‘‘(1) an extensive per-
sonal background history from birth to presentation, (2) a
thorough description of the onset and progress of the pre-
senting disorder, (3) a complete mental status examination
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as the patient first appeared to the psychiatrist […] (4)
inquiry with ‘external informants’ who […] could provide
contexts and continuities enriching what the distressed
patient could report.’’ This proposal only makes sense if the
diagnostic categories are not simply defined by ‘‘symptom
counting’’ [43], that is, a sufficient number of context-free
criteria but are anchored in some sort of descriptive com-
monality, prototype, or Gestalt [51]. In fact, it is now rec-
ognized that a change into a prototype-based approach to
diagnostic classification is needed to improve the validity
and utility of psychiatric categories in the forthcoming 11th
edition of the International Classification of Diseases [74].
We realize that our focus on the modes of subjective
experience, the notions of Gestalt/prototype and context, is
likely to evoke a fear of looming unreliability and sub-
jectivism (i.e., of a methodological regression, rekindling
memories of the psychoanalytic domination of psychiatry).
We are acutely aware of such dangers. However, the psy-
chiatry’s perhaps most important task at hand is to regen-
erate psychopathology [29]. The focus on psychopathology
is not incompatible with empirical rigor and reliability. We
and others have empirically demonstrated that the semi-
structured interviews focusing on subjective experience
may, in fact, attain excellent interrater reliabilities, given
sufficient clinical experience and training of the research
psychiatrists or other clinicians who are involved [23, 72].
It should not be thought that the phenomenological
enterprise in psychopathology is in any way opposed to the
pursuit of scientific objectivity or to the project of neuro-
biological research, properly conceived [58]. The study of
consciousness and even of self-experience has in fact
become a central concern in contemporary neuroscience
and cognitive science, as a spate of recent publications
clearly shows, for example, [11, 15]. There is increasing
interest in studying the neural correlates of such phenom-
ena as emotion, the experience of selfhood, and the very
fact of consciousness itself, but also in demonstrating the
indispensability of the study of conscious life (understood
as embodied and socially embedded) to the explanation of
behavior in general [18, 71]. And it is widely recognized
that this interdisciplinary enterprise—perhaps the central
scientific challenge of the coming decades—will require
paying close attention to the particular nature of subjective
or mental life and its variations, and developing concepts
and techniques adequate to this enterprise. To the extent
that psychiatry ignores this challenge, it excludes itself
from the forefront of scientific progress.
We need a methodological approach that is faithful to
(mental or experiential) reality rather than an approach that
implicitly distorts this reality in order to make it fit to its
own prejudice. Faithfully to assess another person’s
anomalies of experience, belief, expression, and behavior
(the second-person perspective), adds certain specific
demands to our clinical skills and analytic-conceptual
knowledge, constituting psychiatry also as an academic
and scholarly endeavors, while at the same providing solid
foundations for achieving empirical objectivity.
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